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1. introduction
In a recent article, McBride suggests that our ability to understand, apply,
and converse profitably about the law of tort was largely destroyed by a
“catastrophe at some point in the twentieth century.”1 His argument is that,
for reasons as yet unknown,2 our institutional memory – which once
guarded and passed down an intuitive and largely unspoken sense of what
tort law is and how it works – began to erode swiftly at some point in the
last sixty years and has by now all but disappeared from contemporary
judicial decisions. This catastrophe has been so complete that (as will be
seen) even when modern judges are presented with evidence of the prior
understanding they either miss its significance or mistake it as code for
other things (such as evidence of the need for rigorous balancing or the
implementation of hidden policy agendas). The argument of this case
comment is that the recent Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in Antrim
truck Centre Ltd v Ontario (minister of transportation)3 is evidence that
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1 Nicholas J McBride, “Rights and the Basis of Tort Law” in Donal Nolan and
Andrew Robertson, eds, Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 331 at
332.
2 McBride (ibid, at 333, n 12) speculates that one of the causes of the catastrophe
was the increased interest in legal academic circles with questions concerning the powers
of the state and “what form the relations between the State and its citizens should take.
As a result very little interest was paid to tort law – which was very much concerned with
relations between citizens.” We suspect that the rise of legal realist and functionalist
analyses of law – analyses that malign or ignore traditional legal concepts and
methodology but were dominant in academic discussions of private law until fairly
recently – might also bear some of the responsibility; see Ernest Weinrib, “Can Law
Survive Legal Education?” (2007) 60 Vand L Rev 401.
3 2011 ONCA 419, 332 DLR (4th) 641 [Antrim]. 
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this catastrophe has seriously and negatively affected the law of nuisance.4
Because of its clouded understanding, we submit that the Court of Appeal
erred in at least three ways. First, the Court missed an important threshold
step in the test for liability in private nuisance (one that would have been
obvious to judges of an earlier age) and therefore it applied an incomplete
test to the facts of the case. Second, it did not properly distinguish between
rules sourced in private nuisance and those derived from the law of public
nuisance (a failure that would have resulted in the overcompensation of the
plaintiff but for the third error). Third, the Court engaged in an
unwarranted balancing of private and public interests that deprived the
plaintiff of an award of damages which were duly owed under the relevant
statute. 
What is this aforementioned intuitive and unspoken idea that has been
lost? It is that tort law is about the protection of rights and that
concomitantly there is no liability for damnum absque injuria (a loss that
does not follow from a violation of a legal right).5 In the words of one pre-
catastrophe judge, in order to succeed in an action for private nuisance “the
act complained of must be both tortious and hurtful.”6 As McBride notes,
this “rights-based view of tort law would have seemed commonplace at the
start of the twentieth century. But nowadays… it seems strange and
unfamiliar.”7 This comment is an attempt to make explicit this once
orthodox understanding of tort law, to make it less strange and more
familiar, and to suggest how Antrim should have been decided had this
understanding of nuisance not been lost. In order to make these points, this
comment will describe the Antrim litigation, summarize the decision of the
Court of Appeal, analyze the three errors made by the Court, and explain
what the answers should have been had the traditional law been applied
correctly. 
2. the decision
The facts of the Antrim litigation were as follows. Jack and Gail Cameron
were the owners of Antrim Truck Centre Ltd (the plaintiff) which ran a
truck stop on Highway 17 in the hamlet of Antrim at the westernmost edge
of the City of Ottawa. The business was a successful one, grossing revenue
214 [Vol. 90
4 In order to avoid confusion, the use of the term nuisance in this comment
should be taken to refer to both private and public nuisance. When differentiation is
necessary, we will use the terms private nuisance and public nuisance. 
5 For a book-length defence of this idea, see Robert Stevens, torts and Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
6 shuttleworth v vancouver General Hospital (1927), 38 BCR 300 at para 6,
[1927] 2 DLR 573 (SC).
7 McBride, supra note 1 at 335.
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of over $15,000,000 dollars in 2003, its final full year of operation at the
Highway 17 location.8 Over the years, as the result of numerous accidents
caused by its overuse, Highway 17 earned the nickname “the killer
highway.”9 In order to increase capacity and end these dangerous
conditions, the Minister of Transportation (MTO) decided to construct a
new section of four-lane highway, connecting to an existing stretch of
Highway 417 running through downtown Ottawa.10 This did not involve
simply upgrading Highway 17. Instead, a new route was selected which
bifurcated Highway 17 to the east of Antrim and then ran roughly 500
metres to the south.11 After six weeks of construction the re-alignment was
completed in September 2004.12 The paved stretch of Highway 17 in front
of the Truck Centre was merged with Grant’s Side Road, an unpaved farm
access lane.13 Instead of sitting on the main thoroughfare, as it had before,
the plaintiff found itself some two kilometres away from the nearest
interchange of the 417, and its customers were now required to exit at
Regional Road 20 and then turn onto an essentially dead-end segment of
Highway 17.14 As a result of the decreased traffic and loss of visibility this
entailed, business suffered and the plaintiff was forced to sell its property
in Antrim and relocate to a more viable location fifteen kilometres away in
Arnprior, Ontario.15 It claimed operational losses, disturbance damages
and relocation costs amounting to $8,224,671.16
The Antrim litigation was brought as an Ontario Municipal Board
(OMB) action rather than as an action against the province for nuisance in
the Superior Court of Justice.17 This was due to the fact that a nuisance
claim would have been destined to fail since the construction of Highway
417 and the concomitant realignment of Highway 17 were agreed by all
parties to have been conducted in circumstances that would have engaged
the defence of statutory authority,18 a complete defence to a nuisance
claim.19 Instead of nuisance, therefore, the OMB action was brought for
2152011]
8 Antrim, supra note 3 at para 11.
9 ibid at para 1.
10 ibid.
11 ibid at para 14.
12 ibid at para 15.
13 ibid.
14 ibid at para 16.
15 ibid at para 17.
16 ibid at para 3. See also Antrim truck Centre Ltd v Ottawa (City), [2009]
OMBD No 1 at para 36 [Antrim OmB].
17 Antrim OmB, ibid.
18 Antrim, ibid at para 38.
19 See Ryan v victoria (City), [1999] 1 SCR 201 [Ryan]; susan Heyes inc (cob
Hazel & Co) v vancouver (City), 2011 BCCA 77, 329 DLR (4th) 92 [Heyes]; and the
discussion in section 3 C) below.
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“injurious affection” under the Ontario expropriations Act.20 According to
section 1(b) of the Act, injurious affection means: 
where the statutory authority does not acquire part of the land of an owner,
(i) such reduction in the market value of the land of the owner, and
(ii) such personal and business damages,
resulting from the construction and not the use of the works by the statutory authority,
as the statutory authority would be liable for if the construction were not under the
authority of a statute … .
Thus, according to the leading judicial decision on the matter,21 to succeed
in an action for injurious affection under section 1(b), the following legal
tests must be met by the plaintiffs:
a) The damage must result from an act rendered lawful by statutory powers of the
person performing such act (the statutory authority rule).
b) The damage must be such as would be actionable under the common law, but for
the statutory powers (the actionable rule).
c) The damage must be occasioned by the construction of the public work, not its use
(the construction-not-the-use rule).22
At the OMB, the key issue was whether the “actionable rule” had been
made out. The OMB decided that it had. Member Jackson reasoned, on the
basis of decisions such as R v Loiselle,23 and Re City of Windsor and
Larson,24 that the realignment would have amounted to a private nuisance
(but for statutory authority) in that it had substantially interfered with the
plaintiff’s right of access to the highway. Once that determination had been
made, the result of a balancing of the public and private interests at stake
was not in doubt: a “serious impairment”25 had occurred, and compensation
was warranted. The OMB awarded $393,000 in damages, which were
calculated as follows: $58,000 for business losses and $335,000 for the
diminution in market value of the plaintiff’s land.26 The claims for
216 [Vol. 90
20 expropriations Act, RSO 1990, c E26. 
21 st Pierre v Ontario (minister of transportation and Communications), [1987]
1 SCR 906 at 909 [st Pierre].
22 Antrim, supra note 3 at para 21, citing st Pierre, ibid. 
23 [1962] SCR 624 [Loiselle].
24 (1980), 29 OR (2d) 669, 114 DLR (3d) 477 (Div Ct) [Larson].
25 Antrim OmB, supra note 16 at para 54.
26 ibid at paras 57-60.
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disturbance damages and relocation costs were dismissed because “in the
absence of an expropriation of all or part of the land of an owner”27 the
plaintiff was precluded from seeking them.
The decision of the OMB was upheld on appeal to the Ontario
Divisional Court.28 Wilson J, speaking for the Court, confirmed that an
obstruction of access does not have to be complete in order to ground a
claim for private nuisance.29 Instead it was enough that the “construction
of the public works in close proximity to the lands so changed their
situation as to greatly reduce if not eliminate their value for the uses to
which they had been put prior to the construction.”30 Given that Highway
17 was a shadow of its former self, the Court found that the OMB’s
conclusion that the MTO had committed an actionable private nuisance
(but for the statutory authority) was entirely justified. The Court agreed
with the contention of the MTO that there needed to be a balancing done
between the harm to the plaintiff and the utility of the defendant’s conduct
but agreed with the plaintiff that the OMB had “conducted the appropriate
weighing of the public and the private interest and its findings are
reasonable and supported by the evidence.”31
The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the decisions of the
Divisional Court and OMB. Three grounds for appeal were raised, but two
of these (which are not relevant to this comment) were dismissed.32 The
central question quickly became whether the test for private nuisance had
been properly applied by the OMB. Epstein JA, for the Court, began by
laying that test out. She held that it “commands a two part analysis,”33
namely that an interference with the plaintiff’s land, or its use and
enjoyment of its land, must be both “substantial and unreasonable.”34
Showing deference to the discussion of substantiality in the lower courts,
she did not dispute that there had in fact been a substantial interference
with access in this case.35 Rather she focused her decision on
unreasonableness, and the four factors which assist in measuring it: the
2172011]
27 ibid at para 36.
28 Antrim truck Centre Ltd. v. Ontario (minister of transportation), 2010 ONSC
304, 318 DLR (4th) 229 (Ont Div Ct) [Antrim div Ct].
29 ibid at para 93.
30 ibid at para 94; this is a quotation from st Pierre, supra note 21 at para 11.
31 Antrim div Ct, supra note 28 at para 110.
32 The other two grounds of appeal raised were the proper standard of review and
the applicability of the “construction-not-the-use” rule; see Antrim, supra note 3 at paras
50-72 and 145-49 for the discussion and dismissal of these two grounds.
33 Antrim, ibid at para 80.
34 ibid [emphasis in original]. This is a quotation from Fleming, the Law of torts,
9th ed (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1998) at 466.
35 Antrim, supra note 3 at paras 119-23.
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severity of the interference; the character of the area; the utility of the
defendant’s conduct; and the sensitivity of the plaintiff.36 While doing so,
she addressed the question of whether the balancing of these factors, and
more specifically a balancing of the seriousness of the interference with the
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, is truly a part of nuisance law.37
In the end, she decided that finding some sort of balance was in keeping
with “the primary function of the law of nuisance,” which she described as
mediating “the defendant’s interest in using its property as it pleases and
the plaintiff’s interest in the unfettered use and enjoyment of her land.”38
The remainder of her reasons were given over to determining if the
substantial interference in this case had been unreasonable. Moving
through the list of four factors, she briefly pointed out that the lower courts
had ignored the character of the area and the potential sensitivity of the
Truck Centre to traffic changes, before coming to the crux of her decision:
the enormous public utility created by replacing this particular section of
Highway 17. As she bluntly put it, “the highway was built to save lives.”39
As Epstein JA stated: 
When the interference to Antrim’s access, while significant but clearly far from
complete, is measured against the reasonableness of the MTO’s use of its land, in an
area through which a highway already ran, for the purpose of protecting the public
from danger, the conclusion must be that Antrim has not made out a case in nuisance.40
In the end, since they had not given proper scope to this issue of public
utility, both the OMB and the Divisional Court decisions had “failed to
balance” and their decisions could not stand.41 As a proper assessment of
the public interest was sufficient to defeat the private nuisance claim, it
also negated the plaintiff’s claim in injurious affection (which was wholly
built upon the alleged private nuisance because of the “actionable rule”).
Even though it was rendered irrelevant by her decision to allow the appeal,
Epstein JA took the time to explain that the plaintiff’s cross-appeal on the
quantum of damages would have also failed. Since there had been no
actual expropriation of land, the quantum of damages had been correctly
limited by the OMB “to the reduction in the market value of the land
injuriously affected and personal and business damages.”42
218 [Vol. 90
36 ibid at paras 83-92.
37 ibid at paras 93-109.
38 ibid at para 108.
39 ibid at para 140.
40 ibid at para 144. 
41 ibid at para 143.
42 ibid at para 152.
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3. the Analysis
A) the Correct test for Private nuisance
As mentioned in the introduction, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Antrim
makes at least three related errors. The first error is that the Court misses
an important first (but often neglected43) step in its analysis of private
nuisance. As will be recalled, the Court says that a private nuisance is “a
substantial and unreasonable interference with a [plaintiff’s] land or his use
or enjoyment of that land” and that each of substantial interference and
unreasonableness are separate but related inquires.44 Prior to determining
questions of substantiality and unreasonableness, however, the pre-
catastrophe cases make it clear that the courts first have to determine
whether the plaintiff has a right to the amenity, the absence of which the
plaintiff claims is the nuisance. This flows from the fact that a person’s
right to land, like his or her right to bodily integrity, is exclusionary. These
rights stop others from interfering with our bodies and our land, but they
do not compel others to provide us with things that would make these
rights more useful or more enjoyable.45 Consequently, just as a person’s
right to bodily integrity does not require anyone to rescue him or her or
provide him or her with food (hence there is no liability in the common law
for failing to perform an easy rescue, even when failure to do so leads to
death),46 a person’s right to his or her land does not compel others to allow
things to reach this land or require them to use their land in a way that
pleases the plaintiff (hence there is no right to a view47). In the vast majority
of private nuisance cases that involve emanations onto the plaintiff’s land
(such as fumes, smells, noise, vibrations, steam and so on48) neglecting the
2192011]
43 There is perhaps no greater evidence of the catastrophe that has affected private
nuisance than the fact that none of the leading Canadian tort texts makes mention of this
first step or the fundamental distinction between emanations and preventions, except
(perhaps ironically) the non-specialist and student-focused Philip H Osborne, the Law of
torts, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 384-87.
44 Antrim at para 79. The quotation is from John Murphy, street on torts, 12th ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 419. See the discussion of the “two part
analysis” in section 2, above.
45 See e.g. Peter Benson, “Misfeasance as an Organizing Normative Idea in
Private Law” (2010) 60 UTLJ 731.
46 See Childs v desormeaux, [2006] 1 SCR 643. In the language of the classic
cases, this would merely be damnum absque injuria.
47 st Pierre, supra note 21 at para 13: “From the very earliest times, the courts
have consistently held that there can be no recovery for the loss of prospect,” citing
William Aldred’s Case (1610), 9 Co Rep 57 b, 77 ER 816; foli v devonshire Club (1887),
3 TLR 706.
48 See e.g. Walker v mckinnon industries Ltd, [1951] 3 DLR 577 (PC Can)
[Walker] (sulphur fumes); drysdale v dugas (1896), 26 SCR 20 [drysdale] (odour and 
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first step will not lead to the wrong conclusion. The plaintiff’s claim is
simply to exclude the emanation from entering his or her land and the only
right needed to make this analysis work is the bare right to the property in
question.49 In contrast, where the claim is that the nuisance is constituted
by the defendant preventing something entering onto the plaintiff’s land
(such as water or light) or otherwise engaging in an activity that is not an
emanation (such as removing the support of the adjacent soil), the plaintiff
must, in addition to proving his or her entitlement to the land, prove that
he or she has a right to receive that amenity either ex jure naturae (as a
natural incidence of the ownership of the soil)50 or has acquired it via
prescription or grant.51 In these types of cases, then, applying the Court of
Appeal’s overly simplistic test would potentially lead the court to come to
the wrong conclusion52 – effectively giving the plaintiff an easement
(which the law of property says does not exist) without consent of the
owner to be burdened and without payment to him or her.53
220 [Vol. 90
noise); dufferin Paving and Crushed stone Ltd v Anger, [1940] SCR 174 (vibrations);
Chandler electric Co v HH fuller & Co (1892), 21 SCR 337 [Chandler] (steam).
49 For a similar view, see Donal Nolan, “‘A Tort against Land’: Private Nuisance
as a Property Tort” in Nolan and Robertson, supra note 1, 457 at 463: “most private
nuisance cases concern [situations] … where the existence of protection against the type
of interference in question is a given.”
50 Besides the right to access discussed below in section 3 B), the two most
common natural rights are: (1) “the inherent right of a riparian owner to have a stream of
water ‘come to him in its natural state, in flow, quantity and quality’” (Groat v edmonton,
[1928] SCR 522 at 733 [Groat], citing Chasemore v Richards (1859), 7 HLC 349 at 382);
and (2) the right to the lateral support of neighbouring land (Cleland v Berberick (1916),
36 OLR 357 (CA); dalton v Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 740 (HL)). The natural right to
lateral support does not, however, extend to providing support to the buildings on the
land. This right is one which must be acquired by prescription or grant; see Gallant v fW
Woolworth Co, [1971] 1 WWR 336 (SKCA).
51 See earl Putnam Organization Ltd v macdonald (1978) 21 OR (2d) 815 (CA)
where the plaintiff’s suit alleging a nuisance through deprivation of lights was dismissed
on the basis that it could not prove such an acquired right. As the Court noted at fn 7, “a
landowner may so build on his land so as to prevent any light from reaching his
neighbour’s window, unless the neighbour has acquired an easement by way of
prescription or by an express or implied grant.” As a result of s 33 of the Real Property
Limitations Act, RSO 1990, c L.15 it is no longer possible to acquire a right to light
through prescription in Ontario, although “this section does not apply to any such right
acquired by twenty years use before the 5th day of March, 1880.”
52 For a similar view, see Nolan, supra note 49 at 463; Nicholas McBride and
Roderick Bagshaw, tort Law, 3rd ed (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008) at 371-72.
53 For a similar view, see Richard W Wright, “Private Nuisance Law: A Window
on Substantive Justice” in Nolan and Robertson, supra note 1, 489 at 510. This concern
with creating incoherence with the rules of property was one of the reasons why their
Lordships did not find that the interference with television reception was an actionable
nuisance in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, [1997] AC 655 (HL) (see especially Lord Hope 
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This potential to err can be seen most starkly when the simplified test
is applied to two otherwise straightforward decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada (decisions of which the modern test is, of course, meant to be a
synthesis). The first of these cases is Orpen v Roberts.54 The appellant sued
the defendant Roberts for constructing an apartment building so close to an
adjacent road as to be in breach of a by-law requiring a mandated set-back
of 25 feet. She sought an injunction on the grounds that the proximity of
this building to her home would materially reduce the value of her property55
and would therefore constitute a nuisance. Her claim was dismissed by the
lower courts, and the construction of the building ultimately went ahead.
Thus, by the time her case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, Orpen’s
claim was for an injunction ordering the enforcement of the by-law and the
removal of the building, as well as damages. As Duff J said for a majority
of the Court: 
For the purposes of this judgment it will be assumed that there was an infraction of
the by-law. It is not disputed that the existence of the respondent’s apartment house,
situated as it is upon the twenty-five foot strip bordering on Carlton Street, does
prejudicially affect the appellant in respect of the amenities and the value of her
property; and the question to be determined, therefore, is whether, being so specially
damnified, she has a title to judicial relief.56
The Supreme Court of Canada was of the opinion that she did not have
such a title. In other words, despite suffering what was assumed to be
substantial interference with her use and enjoyment of her land – which
was obviously unreasonable in light of the fact that the positioning of the
defendant’s building was actually illegal – she could not make a claim in
private nuisance. As there was no emanation onto her property, she had to
prove the existence of another right that had been infringed in order to
succeed; as Duff J noted, she would have to show that the statute created a
“negative easement … over the property within the area where the by-law
operates.”57 And this she could not do since the relevant legislation
determined that the right to enforce the by-laws was vested in the city and
2212011]
where he stated at 727: “I do not think that it would be consistent with principle for such
a wide and novel restriction to be recognized. If that is so for easements, then the same
result must follow so far as a remedy in nuisance is concerned.”). Cf nor-video services
Ltd v Ontario Hydro (1978) 84 DLR (3d) 221 (Ont HCJ).
54 [1925] SCR 364 [Orpen].
55 While the case is unclear on this point, based on the context and the Court’s
discussion of tompkins v Brockville Rink Co (1899), 31 OR 124, this reduction in value
was likely due to the increased risk of fire, the loss of view and the increased cost of fire
insurance; see Orpen, ibid at 369.
56 Orpen, ibid at 369.
57 ibid at 370.
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created no private right of action in the plaintiff. 58 Unfortunately, her loss
was just another example of damnum asbque injuria. As Idington J noted
in his concurring reasons, if “that conclusion [ie that there is no right of
enforcement vested in the appellant], coupled with the apparent refusal
herein of the city to assist the appellant in maintaining its by-law, renders
the enactment of such a by-law rather farcical I cannot help it.”59
The second of these cases is mcBryan v Canadian Pacific Railway
Co.60 The defendant McBryan owned a farm in British Columbia,
bordering the South Thompson River. For many years, his land adjoined
that of another farmer, Shaw, whose farm was further inland and slightly
uphill. Shaw was in the habit of irrigating his farm during the summer, and
the runoff naturally flowed down over McBryan’s land and into the river.
To protect his crops and topsoil from this runoff, McBryan built a dam on
his own land. Sometime later, the Canadian Pacific Railway Co (CPR)
purchased a strip of land between the two farms and built a rail line. The
dam on McBryan’s land stayed in place after the rail line went in. It had
the effect of forcing Shaw’s irrigation runoff back onto CPR’s strip of land.
For years, CPR did not complain, because the amount of water was
relatively small. However, in 1895, Shaw used a greater than normal
amount of water for irrigation which overwhelmed McBryan’s original
dam. Consequently, McBryan raised the dam to the extent necessary to
prevent flooding on his land. As a result of these actions, the quantity of
water trapped on the rail line was large enough to cause damage to the
track. CPR sued McBryan for compensation and an injunction requiring
him to remove the dam and thereby prevent a recurrence of the flooding.
CPR was awarded both remedies by the Supreme Court of British
Columbia and McBryan appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Court unanimously held that, while there had been a substantial and
reasonably foreseeable interference (hence in modern parlance an
unreasonable interference) with CPR’s property, there was no liability
since CPR’s ownership of its land did not give it a right to discharge water
onto the land of McBryan. As Sedgewick J stated:
It is, I think, a universal principle that a man may do what he likes with his own,
provided that in so doing he does not interfere with some legal right of his neighbour.
In the present case, as I have stated, there was no natural watercourse, there was not
even an artificial watercourse, and in so far as the defendant’s lands were damaged it
was a pure act of trespass on the part of Shaw from which the defendant had a clear
right to protect himself by all lawful means irrespective of any consequences which
might happen to other parties. To prevent the defendant under the circumstances,
222 [Vol. 90
58 municipal institutions Act, RSO 1914, c 192, s 406(10).
59 Orpen, supra note 54 at 376.
60 (1899), 29 SCR 359.
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when he saw his lands being flooded and his property washed away, from interposing
a barrier at the boundary of his property and sending the water back the way it came,
would, I think, be most unreasonable. To compel him to cross over and perhaps
trespass upon the railway lands in order that he might erect a similar barricade on
Shaw’s land would be even more so. And I cannot see why, when he did nothing more
than protect himself … the company can compel him to pay the damages they
sustained, particularly when they had ample means of redress from the originator of
the mischief, and could as easily have protected themselves from injury as the
defendant had done. It seems to me, with great deference, that any other contention is
manifestly erroneous.61
Thus, in so far as the test of private nuisance applied by the Court of
Appeal in Antrim (1) does not cohere with the general understanding of our
right to land being exclusionary; (2) would create incoherence with the law
of property by recognizing natural rights that the law says does not exist
(such as the right to receive water or light) if applied seriously; and (3)
would have extreme difficulty accounting for the results of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s binding decisions in Orpen and mcBryan, we suggest
that the test for nuisance employed in Antrim is overly simplified. As
Locke J stated in Grandel v mason, “nuisance involves damage but
damage alone is not sufficient to give rise to a right of action. There must
be some right in the person damaged to immunity from the damage
complained of.”62 Thus, in the future, courts need to return to the orthodox
analysis, applied in leading cases of high authority such as Canadian
Pacific Railway Co v Albin,63 st Pierre v Ontario (minister of
transportation and Communications),64 tate & Lyle food & distribution
Ltd v GLC,65 victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v
taylor,66 and fontainebleau Hotel Corp v forty-five twenty-five inc67 –
one that first asks whether the plaintiff has a private right to the amenity,
the absence of which the plaintiff claims is the nuisance, before going on
to the question of whether the interference with that right was objectively
substantial and hence unreasonable. 
2232011]
61 ibid at 367-68.
62 Grandel v mason, [1953] 1 SCR 459 at 477. 
63 (1919), 59 SCR 151 at 159 (nuisance requires an “interference with a right
which the owner was entitled to use in connection with his property”).
64 supra note 21 (no right to a view). 
65 [1983] 2 AC 509 (HL) [tate & Lyle] (no private right that a river have a certain
depth); this case is discussed in JW Neyers, “tate & Lyle food & distribution Ltd v
GLC” in C Mitchell and P Mitchell, eds, Landmark Cases in the Law of tort (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2010).
66 [1937] 58 CLR 479 (HCA) (no right of privacy or ownership in a spectacle
arises ex jure naturae).
67 114 So 2d 357 (Fla Ct App 1959) (no right to light).
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B) Confusing Private nuisance and Public nuisance
At this stage in the analysis, one might be forgiven for thinking that the
first section of this comment is overwrought, on the ground that it is
implicit in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that a right was present. After
all, had not both the OMB and the Divisional Court found that the
plaintiff’s right to access had been substantially interfered with? This
brings us to the second problem with the Court of Appeal’s decision,
namely that it was unable to differentiate between private and public
nuisance in areas where the two torts functionally overlap. What is the
conceptual difference between them? In a nutshell: a private nuisance is an
interference with a private right over, or in connection with, land; a public
nuisance is an interference with a public right shared equally with every
member of the community, such as a right to pass and repass on highways
and navigable rivers.68 The other major difference between the two causes
of action (other than the nature of the rights involved) is that a person can
only sue in public nuisance if he or she has suffered “special damage,”
damage which differentiates his or her loss from the loss suffered by the
rest of the community.69 At one time this difference would have been well
understood, but as a result of a series of decisions starting with Larson and
a profound misunderstanding of the laconic decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Loiselle, Canadian courts have merged the two torts in access
cases. This has led them to assert that a substantial deprivation of the
public right to use a highway is actionable in private nuisance since it can
unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of an occupier’s land by
hindering access.70
Given this unwarranted union, one must go back to basics in order to
understand how to resolve this issue in Antrim. At common law, it is clear
that a property owner enjoys a private right of access to a public highway
ex jure naturae as a legal incident of his or her ownership of the adjacent
land. As was stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in toronto transit
Commission v swansea (village): 
There is no difficulty upon the question of the right at common law of an owner of
land adjoining a public highway. He is entitled to access to such highway at any point
at which his land actually touches such highway for any kind of traffic which is
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necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of his premises … . This is a right of property
that was well settled at the common law. … When he reaches the public highway and
travels upon it, the private owner becomes then one of the public using the highway
and subject to all the duties and obligations that rest upon the public generally, but it
is his private right to be fully and freely permitted at all points of his private property
to have freedom of access to the adjoining public highway.71
As other cases make clear, an owner has no such right if his or her land
does not abut the public highway – the right is lost “if a strip of land,
however narrow, belonging to another … intervenes.”72 Thus, according to
these cases as long as proprietors could get whatever vehicle they chose on
and off of their land and onto the public highway there would be no
violation of the private law right of access. Consequently, there would be
no liability in private nuisance in a case like Antrim where the complaint
is that changes farther afield have made the public highway system less
convenient for the uses that the owner wishes to put his or her private
property. This flows from the fact that no private right would have been
interfered with. It would be another example of damnum absque injuria. 
Did the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Loiselle change the
law and expand the private law right of access? Loiselle purchased a piece
of property in Melocheville, Quebec, in 1948.73 For a decade, this property
had direct access to Highway 3, which ran from Montreal to Valleyfield
just south of the St Lawrence River. Loiselle’s principal residence was
soon located there, along with his flourishing garage and gas station
business. In 1957, however, a portion of the St Lawrence Seaway was
excavated only 80 feet from the edge of Loiselle’s land. This canal severed
Highway 3, and turned the section of the road that abutted Loiselle’s
property into a cul-de-sac ending at the waterway. Traffic that once passed
his business was now re-routed to the east of his land, passing through a
tunnel some 1500 feet away. Since none of his land had actually been
expropriated or damaged, Loiselle sued for injurious affection, claiming
that his commercial property had been harmed by the traffic diversion and
the resulting drop in sales. Abbott J held that the courts below had correctly
determined that Loiselle was entitled to compensation in the amount of
$18,018.32 (for the depreciation in the value of his land attributable to the
works) because: 
it seems obvious that had the Seaway Authority or any other person, without statutory
authorization constructed a canal and blocked the main highway adjacent to
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217 Sask R 138.
73 See Loiselle, supra note 23 at 626 for a recounting of these facts.
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respondent’s property, the latter – aside from any other remedies which might have
been open to him – would have had a valid claim in damages under the general law.
The learned trial judge so found and in my respectful opinion he was right in so
doing.74
To what area of the general law is Abbott J referring? Relying solely on this
short exposition one might assume that the answer is private nuisance, as
the court did in Larson75 and Antrim.76 But if one examines the next
paragraph and the reasons of the trial judge, it is clear that Abbott J was
referring to a line of nineteenth-century British cases (later imported into
Canadian law77) which awarded damages for injurious affection on the
basis that the “actionable rule” for injurious affection was satisfied by the
tort of public, rather than private, nuisance.78 The leading decisions in that
line of cases were Ricket v directors of the metropolitan Railway
Company79 and metropolitan Board of Works v mcCarthy.80
The facts of Ricket were as follows. Ricket was a publican in London
operating under the sign of the “Pickled Egg” near the workhouse at
Clerkenwell.81 Under statutory authority granted to the directors of the
railway company, the most convenient route of highway access to Ricket’s
pub was blocked by the defendants for twenty months during the
construction of a rail line in the vicinity. While steps were taken to provide
alternate access, Ricket claimed that his business had been injuriously
affected by the detours attendant upon the construction process.82 As with
the current Ontario statute, in order to succeed the plaintiff was required to
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80 (1874), LR 7 HL 243 [mcCarthy].
81 Ricket, supra note 79 at 176.
82 ibid at 177.
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prove that the defendants had committed an actionable tort. Their
Lordships held, agreeing with the decision of Erle CJ in the Exchequer
Chamber,83 that no tort had been committed. Although several reasons
were marshalled for this conclusion, the primary justification was that the
damages were “too remote to be the subject of an action.”84 As Lord
Chelmsford LC explained: 
Upon a review of all the authorities, and upon a consideration of the sections of the
statutes relating to this subject, I have satisfied myself that the temporary obstruction
of the highway, which prevented the free passage of persons along it, and so
incidentally interrupted the resort to the Plaintiff’s public house, would not have been
the subject of an action at common law … his damage was not of such a nature as to
entitle him to compensation; the interruption of persons who would have resorted to
his house but for the obstruction of the highway, being a consequential injury to the
Plaintiff … .85
Although to modern eyes the mention of remoteness and consequential
loss would seem to be an allusion to factual concepts (such as physical and
temporal closeness) or concerns of policy (such as the prevention of
indeterminate liability),86 it is clear that this is not what their Lordships had
in mind. Instead, their point was that Ricket could not sue because the
damages he suffered were not the consequence of his right to use the public
highway being violated by the actions of the defendant; instead the
damages were the consequence of his customers’ right to use the public
highway being interfered with.87 They had title to sue; he did not. Once
again, Ricket’s loss was an instance of damnum absque injuria. As Walton
J explained in Anglo-Algerian steamship Company Ltd v the Houlder
Line Ltd,88
The true meaning and effect of what Lord Chelmsford said on this point is, I venture
to think, made quite clear by reference to the reasoning of Erle CJ, which Lord
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84 Ricket, ibid at 188.
85 ibid at 196.
86 See e.g. Beth Bilson, the Canadian Law of nuisance (Toronto: Butterworths,
1991) at 58 where she argues: “It could be that the concern which leads to the demand
… that damage be direct is not a concern over remoteness, as such, but is a manifestation
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note 69 at para 16.
87 See Stevens, supra note 5 at 186-87 for a similar view. As a result, there is
nothing “obscure” or “shrouded in mystery” about what is meant by direct or
consequential in public nuisance; cf Kodilinye, supra note 69 at 193-94.
88 [1908] 1 KB 659.
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Chelmsford followed. It there appears that the grounds upon which the Chief Justice
held that the plaintiff could not have recovered in an action at law on the case were,
that he had not been, in the language of the Chief Justice, “obstructed in the exercise
of any right vested in him”; that the damage of which he complained was damage to
his business in consequence of other persons being obstructed in the exercise of their
rights on the public highway… .89
As Walton J made clear, however, Ricket “would have no bearing in a
case” where the complaint was direct – that is, where the loss suffered by
the plaintiff was consequent on the violation of the plaintiff’s own right to
use the public highway.90
As noted above, the primary restriction on such a direct claim in public
nuisance (that is, where one alleges the loss flows from the violation of
one’s public right) is that the plaintiff must prove that he or she has suffered
special damage. The leading case dealing with this issue, in this context, is
mcCarthy. McCarthy regularly made use of the nearby Whitefriars Dock
on the River Thames to carry on his building supply business. The
construction of the Thames Embankment, a massive public works project
managed by the defendants and authorized by statute, involved the
placement of a solid granite wall along the foreshore of the river in order
to prevent flooding and reclaim marshy land. The embankment had the
effect of “permanently stopping up and destroying the Whitefriars Dock”91
and thereby cutting off all access to the river from the street adjoining
McCarthy’s place of business. This resulted in an immediate £1900
diminution in the value of McCarthy’s property.92 Suing for this amount in
injurious affection, the plaintiff won in the Court of Common Pleas and
this judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber. The
House of Lords unanimously supported the award as well, on the basis that
public nuisance could satisfy the “actionable rule” and that the tort of
public nuisance had been made out as the plaintiff had suffered special
damage. As Lord Penzance explained:
If, then, the lands of any owner have a special value by reason of their proximity to
any particular highway, surely that owner will suffer special damage in respect of
those lands beyond that suffered by the general public if the benefits of that proximity
are withdrawn by the highway being obstructed. And if so, the owner of such lands
appears to me to fall within the rule under which an action is maintainable, though the
right interfered with is a public one. 
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It was asked in argument where are the claims to compensation to stop if the rule be
so applied? The answer I think is, that in each case the right to compensation will
accrue whenever it can be established to the satisfaction of the jury or arbitrator that
a special value attached to the premises in question by reason of their proximity to, or
relative position with, the highway obstructed, and that this special value has been
permanently destroyed or abridged by the obstruction.93
Later cases made clear that the mcCarthy understanding as to special
damages could not apply where the diminution in value was so widespread
as to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s damages were no longer distinctive.
As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in R v macArthur, “It was never
intended that where the execution of works, authorized by Acts of
Parliament, sentimentally affected values in the neighbourhood, all such
property owners could have a claim for damages.”94
As a result of these cases, the rules relating to claims of public
nuisance based on the closing and rerouting of highways were relatively
clear. In order to succeed the plaintiff had to prove that his or her land had
suffered a permanent diminution in value that was consequential on the
violation of the plaintiff’s right to use the highway affected. The plaintiff
could not sue for business losses (such as from diminished sales or loss of
custom) because such losses were too remote, being consequential on the
violation of the rights of the plaintiff’s customers rather than rights vested
in the plaintiff him or herself. It is clear that Abbott J had these principles
in mind in Loiselle and that he also applied them correctly as to liability
and quantum: 
The learned trial judge found that the construction of the canal and the diversion of
the highway had adversely affected respondent’s land as a commercial property and
there is ample evidence to support that finding. He fixed the damages at $18,018.32.
This amount included a sum of $5,280.90 for depreciation of respondent’s residence
on the basis that the garage building and residence were interdependent. Under
ordinary circumstances, it would seem unlikely that the construction of the canal and
the diversion of the highway would diminish the value of land for residential
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purposes. However we do not have to consider that aspect of the matter here, since
counsel for appellant made no special point of the house … .95
What should the result in Antrim have been if the Court of Appeal had
correctly applied the principles in Loiselle? In regard to the $335,000
awarded by the OMB for the diminution in the market value of the
plaintiff’s land, it seems quite clear that this can be justified as special
damage for public nuisance under the analysis given in mcCarthy and
subsequent cases. This loss is recoverable since it flows from the violation
of the plaintiff’s right to pass and repass over Highway 17 in the exact state
it existed prior to the MTO’s extensive changes (which for the purposes of
an injurious affection claim must be understood to have been made without
statutory authority). In regard to the $58,000 that the OMB awarded as
business damages for loss of custom, it is clear on these same principles
that these losses are too remote in the sense used by the Court in Ricket.
These losses flow from the infringement of the customers’ right to use the
public highway (not from the plaintiff’s) and are therefore unrecoverable.
Although it is commonly assumed that since the expropriation Act
definition expressly now allows for “personal and business damages” 96
these are recoverable in every claim of injurious affection,97 this is not the
case. As section 1(b) makes clear the relevant statutory authority or agency
is only liable for “such personal and business damages” as “the statutory
authority would be liable for if the construction were not under the
authority of a statute.” Thus, as these damages would not be recoverable in
the tort of public nuisance, they cannot be recovered under the statute. It is
therefore imperative for courts to be clear which cause of action is being
advanced in order to meet the “actionable rule” needed to succeed in a
claim of injurious affection. If the tort is public nuisance then no damages
should be given for business losses in the form of lost custom (since such
losses flow from the violation of another’s rights) but if the claim is in
private nuisance, business losses may be awarded if they are consequential
on the violation of the plaintiff’s rights over or in connection with his or
her land.98
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C) the Balancing Process inherent in the Law Of Private nuisance
Having examined the difficulties that flow from applying an over-
simplified test of private nuisance and from failing to correctly distinguish
between private and public nuisance, we now turn our attention to perhaps
the gravest error in Antrim, namely the claim by the Court that the law of
private nuisance requires a balancing between the harm suffered by the
plaintiff (the substantial interference) and the social utility of the
defendant’s conduct (the reasonableness of that interference). Such a view
is misguided, for five reasons. 
The first reason why this view of nuisance is misguided is that, if taken
seriously, it would mean that there could almost never be a successful
nuisance claim, or a claim in injurious affection built upon nuisance,
against a government for an important public works project. As the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal stated in Airport Realty Ltd v
newfoundland (minister of Works, services, and transportation):99
[T]here is no requirement that substantial interference and reasonableness be
balanced, one against the other, to determine which has the greater weight. It would
be ludicrous, for example, to argue against the reasonableness of the St. Lawrence
Seaway in Loiselle, the overpass over the rail line in Jesperson’s Brake & muffler or
the highway realignment to an expanding airport in a growing city in Gerry’s food
mart.100
The existence and success of so many of these claims, both traditional and
modern, against important public works projects (as were each of Loiselle,
Jesperson’s, Gerry’s food mart and Airport Realty) means that the Antrim
court’s understanding of the law must be wrong.101
A second reason to doubt this aspect of Antrim is that it runs counter
to the overwhelming academic and judicial consensus that reasonableness
is not a separate element in the private nuisance inquiry but rather
something that informs and frames the substantial interference
2312011]
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99 2001 NFCA 45, 205 Nfld & PEIR 95 (Nfld CA).
100 ibid at para 39, citing Jesperson’s Brake & muffler Ltd v Chilliwack (district)
(1994), 88 BCLR (2d) 230 (CA) [Jesperson’s] and Gerry’s food mart Ltd v st John’s
(City) (1992), 104 Nfld & PEIR 294 (Nfld CA) [Gerry’s food mart].
101 See also Willis v Halifax (Regional municipality), 2010 NSCA 76, 295 NSR
(2d) 190 (CA) (damages awarded against municipality for operation of sewage treatment
facility); sutherland v Canada (Attorney General), 2002 BCCA 416, 215 DLR (4th) 1
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requirement. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in st Lawrence
Cement inc v Barrette, “nuisance is a field of liability that focuses on the
harm suffered rather than on prohibited conduct.” 102 Similar views are
expressed by Pun and Hall,103 Nolan,104 Wright,105 Bilson,106 Linden and
Feldthusen,107 and Klar.108 What is it then that reasonableness adds to
substantial interference? It reminds the court of two things: to begin with,
that the question of whether the interference is substantial is to be
answered from an objective standpoint of the reasonable user;109 next, that
this objective assessment does not take place in a vacuum but rather needs
to be done in light of the character of the neighbourhood where the plaintiff
has chosen to purchase his or her land.110 As the old phrase goes, “what
would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in
Bermondsey.”111 Therefore, while there is no doubt that some sort of
balancing is done in private nuisance, this balancing is not between the
social utility of the uses (with the most highly valued use trumping the use
of the other).112 The balancing is instead done between the competing uses
of property owners to ensure that all have some use of their land and that
no one owner can unilaterally sterilize or expropriate the uses of
another.113 This is what animates and explains references to “give and take,
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live and let live”114 that appear in the traditional case law – not concerns
of social utility or public benefit.115
A third reason why this view of the law is misguided is that it sits
awkwardly alongside other doctrines in the law of nuisance and similar
torts. For example, if it is true that substantial interference and
reasonableness are to be balanced, why is it that a long line of authority
holds that social utility is largely irrelevant when the nuisance is alleged to
be physical damage to the land (as opposed to an interference with the use
and enjoyment of that land)?116 As the Court held in Royal Anne Hotel Co
v Ashcroft (village): 
[W]here the conduct of the defendant has caused actual physical injury to the
plaintiffs’ land the mere fact that such conduct may be of great social utility, for
example construction and maintenance of a sewer, will not attract greater licence or
immunity.117
Given that the right at issue (the right to land) and the cause of action
(private nuisance) are the same, and given that many physical interferences
with land can be much less bothersome and interfere less with one’s plans
than other non-physical interferences, it would seem profoundly odd if
there were separate rules for each of these branches of private nuisance.118
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Another example of ill fit is provided when one compares the
reasoning of Antrim with the defence of statutory authority. According to
a long line of precedent, “[s]tatutory authority provides, at best, a narrow
defence to nuisance. The traditional rule is that liability will not be
imposed if an activity is authorized by statute and the defendant proves
that the nuisance is the ‘inevitable result’ or consequence of exercising
that authority.”119 This narrowness120 is said to be justified by the principle
that in
determining whether an authorized activity is to be relieved of ordinary tort liability,
the statute authorizing the activity must be given a strict construction. The Legislature
is not to be deemed to have taken away the legal remedies of private persons and their
right to compensation for injury to their legally recognized interests unless a contrary
intention is clearly manifested by the legislation.121
If the Court in Antrim is right, however, the narrow defence of statutory
authority and the presumption against expropriating people’s rights can be
totally by-passed by simply analyzing reasonableness (shorn of these
limitations) in the liability stage of the nuisance inquiry. If Antrim truly
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represents the law, then governments are better off proceeding with large
public works projects without any statutory authority and arguing
reasonableness and public benefit if and when they are sued. The fact that
the reasoning deployed in Antrim leads to such a radical result indicates
that something has gone wrong in the underlying analysis. 
The same disquiet is felt if the Antrim process of reasoning is
transposed to the tort of trespass (which deals with direct interferences
with land, rather than with the indirect interferences dealt with by private
nuisance).122 What would the reaction of a court be if a defendant argued
that, although it had extended its factory onto neighbouring land without
the owner’s permission, this was not a trespass “because doing so would
create lots of new jobs, and the land in question was derelict and socially
useless”?123 Prior to the catastrophe outlined in the introduction, the
defendant surely would have been laughed out of court, and we suspect
that a similar reaction would still be produced today.124 In fact, as Wright
points out, to behave in such a way is still “more likely to lead to a punitive
damage award than a finding of reasonableness.”125 Yet if this is true of
trespass (that is, that social utility is irrelevant), why should it not be true
of nuisance, given that, as Pun and Hall point out, trespass and nuisance
are “conceptual companions” and “necessary counterparts”?126
A fourth problem with Antrim’s use of reasonableness and social
utility is its lack of underlying jurisprudential support. Although almost
every modern discussion of nuisance asserts that an examination of social
utility is a necessary step in the private nuisance analysis (either under the
head of substantial interference or of reasonableness), when one examines
the authorities on which this claim is based, it can be seen that these are all
either manifestations of other principles or are readily distinguishable. For
example, in the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in st Lawrence
Cement, the Court stated that whether an activity is a substantial
interference is to be “assessed by considering factors such as the nature,
severity and duration of the interference, the character of the
neighbourhood, the sensitivity of the plaintiff’s use and the utility of the
activity …”127 As authority for this proposition, the Court relied on the
Linden and Feldthusen treatise128 which in turn relies on two lines of
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127 st Lawrence Cement, supra note 102 at para 77 [emphasis added]. 
128 supra note 107 at 569. 
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authority for support. The first line of cases holds plaintiffs liable in private
nuisance for otherwise lawful conduct where such conduct is done
“wantonly and maliciously.”129 The leading case is Hollywood silver fox
farm Ltd v emmett.130 In that case, the defendant sent his son to fire a
shotgun near a neighbour’s fox-breeding pens in order to spoil the mating
season (during which fox vixens are very excitable) and to damage his
neighbour’s business. This was done ultimately in order to induce the
plaintiff to remove a large sign (which it had previously refused to do) that
advertised the fox farm and which the defendant thought threatened his
plan to subdivide his land into a housing estate. Although the
oversensitivity of the plaintiff’s use would normally have been fatal to its
claim, the Court found for the plaintiff. As the judge held, there is no
absolute right to create noise, and where such noise is made to “vex and
annoy” it may still be found to be a private nuisance and enjoined.131
While this line of cases is commonly held up as importing concerns of
social utility into nuisance law this is not the case. As Wright points out,
malicious conduct is prohibited as a matter of law irrespective of its social
utility – “[n]o one even thinks of comparing the utility the defendant gains
from his or her malicious conduct with the disutility suffered by the
plaintiff.”132 For example, on the facts of Hollywood silver fox farm
itself it seems very likely that the plaintiff’s building estate would have
promised more public utility than the defendant’s fox-fur pelts. If not social
utility, what then is the principle that animates these decisions? It is simply
that persons cannot use their rights with the express intention of frustrating
others’ use of their rights.133 As Ripstein has pointed out, if one of the
functions of a legal system is to delineate the scope of our rights so that
they are not necessarily in conflict, a mature legal system would, as a
matter of course, prohibit the conduct in Hollywood silver fox farm in
order to prevent this kind of conflict from systematically arising.134
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delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, 3 November 2010) [text
on file with the authors] where he states: 
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The second source of authority relied upon by Linden and Feldthusen
is st Pierre. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada stated: 
All highway construction will cause disruption. Sometimes it will damage property,
sometimes it will enhance its value. To fix the Minister with liability for damages to
every landowner whose property interest is damaged, by reason only of the
construction of a highway on neighbouring lands, would place an intolerable burden
on the public purse. Highways are necessary … .135
The difficulty with relying on this statement in st Pierre is that it is obiter
dicta.136 It was pronounced after the Court had already decided against the
plaintiff for the entirely orthodox reason that since the plaintiffs could not
prove that they had a right violated their private nuisance claim
automatically failed (the only possible right involved, other than the right
to their land, was the illusory “right” to a view). If anything, st Pierre is
authority for the traditional two-step process for nuisance outlined earlier
(viz, examining the threshold issue of whether or not there is a right, before
any examination of substantial interference)137 rather than for the two-step
process employed by the court in Antrim. Even mandrake management
Consultants Ltd v toronto transit Commission,138 which the Court of
Appeal relied upon extensively in Antrim, is easily explainable on the
orthodox basis that as the plaintiff’s use of its property was objectively
extra-sensitive its private nuisance claim was destined to fail.139 In
addition, it is arguable, once again, that the Court’s whole discussion of
private nuisance in mandrake management is obiter dicta, this time on the
basis that the Court found as a preliminary matter that the plaintiff had
failed to prove that the defendants had actually caused the noise and
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plaintiff. It is not a purpose that is inconsistent with purposiveness as such; it is
instead that the use of frustration of another’s use of means as a means is
inconsistent with the usability of means as such. Put differently, it is not that you
cannot make the frustration of another’s purpose your purpose; chess players and
other competitive athletes do that all the time. It is that you cannot use your means
in a way that is necessarily inconsistent with others using theirs. You can use them
is a way that is possibly or even actually so; but you cannot use them in a way that
is necessarily so.
135 st Pierre, supra note 21 at para 13.
136 For a similar view, see Jesperson’s, supra note 100 at paras 30-32. See also
Coates and Waqué, supra note 97 at 10-154.24, § 2.3.
137 See supra, section 3 A).
138 (1993), 102 DLR (4th) 12 (Ont CA) [mandrake management].
139 ibid at 22, where the Court states: “If noise and vibrations from subway trains
are deleterious influences, it may well be that the plaintiffs have no cause of action
because 15 Bedford Road is more than ordinarily sensitive to them.” 
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vibrations that it claimed was the nuisance.140 Thus, as the leading cases
usually said to underpin the courts’ reliance on social utility either stand for
other principles or are obiter statements used to buttress findings arrived at
using orthodox analysis (quite apart from social utility), there is no real
warrant for Epstein JA’s conceptual move in Antrim.
A fifth and final reason why the process of reasoning employed in
Antrim is problematic is that such a process is profoundly undemocratic.141
In taking it upon itself to decide what is in the public interest, the court, as
Nolan points out, is making two mistakes:
The first mistake is the failure to appreciate that the appropriate forum for arguments
regarding social welfare is not the private law court but the legislature. Only the most
diehard libertarian would deny that sometimes private rights must give way to the
public interest, but … the power to make such decisions [is given] to legislators who
are democratically accountable for their actions. The second mistake is the erroneous
assumption that the judiciary are in a position to assess where the interests of the
masses lie, or which outcome will maximise overall welfare.142
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On basic principle, it would seem to me that the plaintiffs had to prove that the
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142 Nolan, supra note 49 at 487.
Commentaire d’arrêt
Might modern judges want to arrogate to themselves this ability to trump
private rights because they fear that the zealous pursuit and protection of
these rights might frustrate public works projects that are necessary for the
overall good of society?143 The obiter dicta from st Pierre quoted above
are, we think, evidence of this fear. With respect, however, the courts need
to remember that nothing that they say or do in a private law case can ever
stop a public works project. The legislature has almost unlimited powers
within its constitutional heads of power to make sure that a project can go
ahead (if it truly is in the public interest). The legislature can expropriate
property and pay compensation. It can expropriate property without
compensation if such compensation would place “an intolerable burden on
the public purse.”144 The legislature can also give people statutory
immunity for the creation of nuisances145 or statutorily authorize an
activity. Moreover, if the courts misinterpret this grant of statutory
authority, the legislature can intervene to retroactively deem the public
work in question to have been constructed, maintained and operated under
such authority.146 Similarly, if claims of injurious affection become too
burdensome to the public purse or overwhelming in number, the rules
regarding these claims can be changed (as they have in the past) since
injurious affection actions are entirely the creature of statute. 
In our view, the attitude of pre-catastrophe judges to the division of
powers between private law courts and legislatures is to be preferred.147 As
Stewart J put it in stephens v village of Richmond Hill:
It is quite natural and proper that [government officials] … should insist upon the
importance of the welfare of the people at large, but I conceive that it is not for the
judiciary to permit the doctrine of utilitarianism to be used as a make-weight in the
scales of justice. In civil matters, the function of the Court is to determine rights
between parties. It investigates facts by hearing “evidence” (as tested by long-settled
rules) and it investigates the law by consulting precedents. Rights or liabilities so
ascertained cannot, in theory, be refused recognition and enforcement, and no judicial
tribunal claims the power of refusal… .
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It is the duty of the State (and of statesmen) to seek the greatest good for the greatest
number. To this end, all civilized nations have entrusted much individual
independence to their Governments. But be it ever remembered that no one is above
the law. Neither those who govern our affairs, their appointed advisers, nor those
retained to build great works for society’s benefit, may act so as to abrogate the
slightest right of the individual, save within the law. It is for Government to protect
the general by wise and benevolent enactment. It is for me, or so I think, to interpret
the law, determine the rights of the individual and to invoke the remedy required for
their enforcement.148
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Antrim erred in at least
three ways. First, the Court applied the wrong two-step test for private
nuisance. Instead of starting its analysis with the concepts of substantial
interference and reasonableness, the Court should first have examined if
the plaintiff had a right to the amenity the absence of which the plaintiff
claims was the nuisance. If, and only if, this question was answered in the
affirmative should the Court have proceeded to the question of whether the
interference was objectively substantial in light of the community standard
and hence a private nuisance. Second, the Court failed to distinguish the
private law right of access (which arises ex jure naturae) and which is
protected in the tort of private nuisance, from the right to pass and repass
over the highway which is protected by the tort of public nuisance
(provided that the plaintiff suffers special damage). Third, the Court
decided that the MTO’s “reasonable” decision in creating a new highway
outweighed the plaintiff’s otherwise valid claim for damages on the basis
that balancing social utility and harm are an integral part of the law of
private nuisance. Had the Court properly focused on the rights (the injuria)
involved rather than the losses sustained by either the plaintiff or the public
purse (the damnum), it would have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff
could maintain an injurious affection action in the amount of $335,000.
This result flows from the fact that the actions of the MTO would have, but
for the relevant statutory authority, constituted a tort actionable under the
common law. This tort was not the tort of private nuisance, as all levels of
decision makers had assumed, but rather the tort of public nuisance – a tort
for which the plaintiff could have sued because it had suffered the requisite
special damage. The fact that the Court of Appeal could not reach this
relatively simple conclusion (even when the relevant authority was cited to
it) is evidence of the catastrophe that has befallen our tort law. As this
comment has attempted to show, the only way forward (at least in the
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immediate future) is to return (metaphorically) to past decisions of high
authority where the “rights-based view of tort law would have seemed
commonplace.”149 As Wilson J correctly stated in tock v st John’s
metropolitan Area Authority: 
The early principles, it seems to me, are rooted in common sense and logic. There is
no need to throw the baby out with the bath water. Let us rather return the law to
where it once was.150
We wholeheartedly agree.
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